The U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission “was created in October 2000 by the Floyd D. Spence National Defense Authorization Act for 2001 § 1238, Pub. L. No. 106-398, 114 STAT. 1654A-334 (2000) (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 7002 (2001)), as amended, and the “Consolidated Appropriations Resolution of 2003,” Pub. L. No. 108-7, dated February 20, 2003.”
To monitor, investigate, and submit to congress an annual report on the national security implications of the bilateral trade and economic relationship between the United States and the People’s Republic of China, and to provide recommendations, where appropriate, to Congress for legislative and administrative action.
Anyone remember that Chinese Defense Minister Gen. Chi Haotian said war with the USA was “inevitable”?
On July 12, 2001, U.S. Senator James M. Inhofe referenced this in testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee on Missile Defense:
We recall that just two years after that, the secretary of Defense or minister of Defense of China said war is — it was Chi Haotian — said war with America is inevitable.
On Thursday, September 15, 2005, a hearing was held at 9:00 a.m. in the Russell Senate Office Building in Washington, D.C. The “official,” edited transcript of that hearing has not yet been released, but an unedited version provides this testimony from Commissioner George Becker — who was reappointed to the U.S.-China Economic & Security Review Commission by Democratic Leader Nancy Pelosi for a three-year term expiring December 31, 2005:
There’s been a lot of comments in the newsprint, television, lately about a lot of non-military activities that are directed towards the United States, information warfare like the “Titan Rain,” going into our data banks, both militarily and within the banking system and the stock markets, hacking, if you would.
The economy is one-sided that’s allowed the Chinese to accumulate hundreds of billions of dollars of U.S. assets, currency reserves, the acquisition of our technical, U.S. high tech systems in the United States by fair means or foul, read in the library, buy it or steal it. It doesn’t make any difference. Intellectual property, they put the figure now, the last I heard was $250 billion annually, and I’m not talking about toys or dresses. I’m talking about patents and copyrights, secrets, protected interests of the United States. All of this is in conjunction with what you were talking about here about the build-up of military assets in China.
Taken together the things that I mentioned, and not military, non-military activities and the military activity, I see China building an arsenal of weapons that can be used against the United States in conjunction, one in conjunction to the other, and to be honest about it, I never connected the dots until I picked up this book here, and you mentioned the Unrestricted Warfare. It’s easy to discard it, to say it’s fantasy, but it deals with exactly what I’m talking about and much, much more.
The tying of military and non-military, attacking every aspect of social, economic and political life in our country, a war with no rules, no limits, no morality. They underscore blood and cruelty in order to shock the citizens in the other country. I guess you could say that’s terrorism. I don’t know. And while I may disagree or you may disagree with all of this, I believe we need to take a look at China’s actions.
Are all of you familiar with this book? I didn’t want to just stand there holding that. I would challenge anybody if they didn’t, if they just pushed it aside and didn’t even look at it. This was written by two high ranking officers of the PLA Army, both of them colonels. It was printed by the PLA printing operation and disseminated throughout the PLA ranks.
So there is some degree of credibility in this, and I think we need to look at this as a part of China’s overall strategy in dealing with the United States. My questions–I have two very simple on this–do you think that we should view the actions of the Chinese, military and non-military, as creating an arsenal of war and isn’t this all a part of a coordinated plan that threatens the United States? And I would open that up to all of you. At your pleasure.
In response to that, Dr. Laurent Murawiec, Sr. Fellow, Hudson Institute, Washington, DC, states:
I think it’s very important, sir, to consider that in Chinese statecraft, there is no border whatsoever between political and military action. In the Western tradition, we declare war. There is no equivalent in Chinesetradition. You don’t declare war. You go to war. And going to war is not something that is restricted to military affairs. It is an integrated conception.
Traditionally, in Chinese history, the party always led the guns, meaning the Mandarins always led the generals. And the pattern of activity that you describe is of that order.
Now, as far as the book you held up is concerned, I think that to some extent that book is a lot of wishful thinking on the part of its authors. It shouldn’t lead us at all to neglect or to rule out its importance because if I have wishful thinking, I will do what I wish or I will try to do what I wish.
So it indicates a direction of thinking, a direction of organization, a direction of organization, a direction of action, and it’s also, I think, if not a training manual, it’s a great pep talk for the troops. It tells us, if you allow me, you look at German general staff literature prior to World War I, you will find also the same rampant dreams, some of which are utterly wishful and many of which were actually realized.
So it tells us whatever the ulterior motives present in that book and I think it’s like many things in China, you got to look at the plot within the plot within the plot and then some. And there are many motivations in that particular book, I think. But I think we should indeed take it seriously, and I would think, yes, there is this, the coordinated plan, which is based on China’s self-conception.
So, if you consider Titan Rain to be some tinfoil-hat conspiracy theory, add a few more people to those who give that theory a bit more credence than naysayers.
Never, ever underestimate your enemy, especially when they have clearly telegraphed a punch. That the punch may be years in coming makes its impact all the more serious.
As Sun Tzu states in chapter ten of “Art of War”:
When a general, unable to estimate the enemy’s strength, allows an inferior force to engage a larger one, or hurls a weak detachment against a powerful one, and neglects to place picked soldiers in the front rank, the result must be ROUT.
This explains the quick fall of Saddam’s Iraq. Let’s not keep this concept far from our minds.
Ian, The Political Teen, is having Open Trackback Monday, so I’ll throw this post out as my submission.